The "Software Factory" reconsidered: An Approach to the Strategic Management of Engineering by Cusumano, Michael A.
CE
ZAM
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF ENGINEERING
Michael A. Cusumano
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technoloqy
MITJSTP 87-08
DISTRIBUTED COURTESY OF
MIT-JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
Room E53447
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 253-2449
THE "SOFTWARE FACTORY" RECONSIDERED:
AN APPROACH TO THE
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF ENGINEERING
Michael A. Cusumano
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technoloqy
MITJSTP 87-08
Michael A. Csumano 6/1/87
MIT Sloan Scl'ool of Management Software Project Paper #1
Working Ppe' #1885-87
THE "SOFTWARE FACTORY" RECONSIDERED:
AN APPFR;OACH TO THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF ENGINEERING 1
Contents:
I ntroduction
i. Conceptual Framework
II. Software Industries in the U.S. and Japan
Ill. The Survey
IV. Implications for Engineering Management
Conclusion s
Appendix: Data Analysis
I NTRODU(:TION
T!his parer examines the question of whether or not companies are
choosing t.o anage a complex engineering activity such as large-scale
softwaire de,;!elopment with a range of strategic considerations and
organizational as well' as technological approaches that corresponds to the
spectrum usually associated with "hard" manufacturing, i.e. job shops, batch
organizations, and factories exhibiting various degrees of flexibility in
product mixes and technologies. There are several interrelated conclusions:
(1) This spe trum, including "factory" approaches, is observable in a
statisticall significant sample of managers at 38 software facilities in the
U.S. ;:ind apai. (2) The existence of this spectrum suggests there is a range
of beliefs imong managers as to how software development should or can be
managed; :nd that there is nothing inherent in software as a technology that
prevents ;om,' firms from managing the development process in a more
discipline, "factory-like" mannner than others. (3) Japanese firms -- led by
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the NEC group and Toshiba, followed by NT&T, Hitachi, and Fujitsu -- are
significant;y ahead of most U.S. competitors in applying what might be called
a disciplined and flexible factory approach -- applying production-
management cncepts, general-use tools, standardized procedures, effective
quality-contrcl techniques -- to large-scale software development.
The research methodology followed was to develop a conceptual model
consisting of 23 criteria related to software support tools and technologies
as well as to various policies or methodologies for design standardization,
documentation, reusability, maintenance, portability, and the like. Surveys
were then received from managers at 38 major facilities making two types of
products that usually require large amounts of people, time, and tools to
develop, and which might provide incentives for managers to seek
similar itaries and common components or tools across different projects:
operating systems for mainframes or minicomputers ("systems" software); and
real-time applications programs, such as for factory control or reservations
systems (''apl,ications" software). An underlying assumption was that a
persistent worldwide shortage of software engineers and rising demand for
computer programs might have convinced some managers to try to rationalize
development activities much as their' predecessors in other industries have
rationalized "hard" manufacturing.
Ther.e as been extensive research, as well as trial-and-error
development, f software tools and environments over the past decades. The
concept of a "software factory" rather than a laboratory as a model for
integrating; tools and procedures in a systematic, disciplined environment was
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first discussed in a 1960s' NATO science conference. It was then attempted
(successfully) in Japan beginning in the late 1960s at Hitachi and in the U.S.
(with less uccess) during the mid-1970s at System Development Corporation.
Subsequent to Hitachi, most other large Japanese software producers have
created disciplined, tool-intensive, centralized facilities for software
development, incorporating many process-analysis, production-mangement, and
especially ;quality-control concepts or techniques used in hardware factories.
U.S. firms have also made progress in software engineering, but since SDC
and the late 1970s, have avoided using the term "factory" to describe their
facilities or efforts to improve software productivity.
As a general observation, it seems that the process-management skills
Japanese firms have demonstrated in various manufacturing fields, resulting
in extrordinarily high levels of productivity and quality control, occur with
surprising regularity in their software engineering facilities and far more
frequently than in comparable U.S. facilities. This may be a disturbing
conclusion to U.S. managers and policy makers who have believed that the
U.S. lead over Japan and other countries was insurmountable at least in
software. While this paper makes no attempt to deny that the U.S. has a
large and alerlted supply of software programmers, it does suggest that U.S.
firms may not be leaders in implementating software-engineering tools and
managementr techniques. Moreover, management aspects are becoming
increasing important to improving productivity and quality in the software
industry s the shortage of programmers and the demand for programs
continue. A relative stabilization in the product technology that may be
occurring would also make "process innovation" in software more likely,
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theoretically, and possible on a practical level.
This paper, and parallel case studies currently in preparation, argue as
well that firms can achieve significant standardization and rationalization of
the development process even if they cannot or will not standardize their
end products as in a mass-production factory. In this sense, the term
"software factory" does not imply rigidity. In fact, facilities closest to the
proposed factory model either customized products such as applications
programs or designed unique products such as operating systems. The
factory analogy should thus be thought of as synonomous with a strategic
commitment, at the company- or at least facility-level, to providing
sufficient scale of people and operations to justify research and development
for process technology and techniques; institutionalizing "good" technology
and practice; improving process efficiency through teamwork and better
inter-group communication; allowing an entire organization to focus more on
worker productivity and product quality; and eliminating waste and
redundancies due to dysfunctional behavior and the lack of an organizational
strategy. Perhaps the most important potential benefit of this approach
would be defect control, since data from IBM, TRW, and GTE indicate that
fixing bugs in a completed program during operation can cost 100 times that
of detecting errors in the design stage. 2
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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A Spectrum of Manufacturing Strategies_and Organizations
Before discussing software, a review of how other products have been
developed provides some perspectives on the different strategic and
organizational options potentially available to an engineering organization.
Throughout history, in a variety of industries, countries, and time periods,
product technology for goods such as books, textiles, guns, paper, and
automobile; tended to standardize, at least temporarily. As production
volumes increased, many companies shifted their focus from product
development to process innovation -- including areas such as standardization
of components and procedures, specialization and division of labor, task
automation -- to evolve from craft-like job-shops or batch operations to
large-scale dsign and production for mass markets. As Chandler has
described, American companies were leaders in establishing this new mode of
mass production and organization.3
Once firmrs made this transition, the strategic issues job-shop managers
faced making one-of-a-kind products -- raising organizational and perhaps
technologi-cal flexibility, product customization, or quick reaction to
individual customers -- tended to give way to concerns such as how to
increase volumes, lower unit costs, reduce product variety and complexity,
improve stanclards and process integration, or raise the levels of automation
while lower'inc: the skills required of workers. The results of moving in this
direction - which Ford perfected with the Model-T before World War I--
included ig er productivity and lower unit costs, and helped make
sophisticated goods such as automobiles accessible to large numbers of
5
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consumers. As Abernathy and Utterback postulated in 1975, these benefits
appeared to offset the higher quality, greater possibilities for product
differentiation, and general flexibility in terms of products, worker tasks,
and technology found in job-shop or batch operations. 4
Authors who wrote prior to the early 1980s accurately pointed out the
risks and benefits of basing the strategic management of engineering and
manufacturing on this concept of a "product-process matrix" or "life cycle."
But they had not fully recognized that, during the 1950s, to accommodate a
small but rapidly growing market in Japan, a fourth type of manufacturing
(and engineering for manufacturability) model had also appeared. Pioneered
most effectively at Toyota, the Japanese managed to combine many of the
benefits of mass-production factory environments with the flexibility of
batch operations. This approach (gradually imitated by other Japanese firms
in a variety of industries) relied upon even stricter process control and
standardization of components and procedures than Ford had achieved, but
broadened the job specifications of workers, used automation much more
selectively, and added an interrelated set of process strategies and
techniques (rapid equipment set-up times, low in-process inventory levels and
a "just-in-time" manufacturing and delivery discipline, greater use of
subcontracting, "total" quality control programs and worker self-inspection.)
The entire Toyota system thus served to facilitate production in small rather
than large lots (batches). But, in addition to this greater flexibility, the
process discipline and innovations it incorporated led to the highest levels of
physical productivity among world automakers. The Toyota case also
demonstrated clearly that process efficiency was not achieved merely by
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technology, sch as automated machinery. The most important contributions
to production improvements at Toyota appeared to lie in the management
policy area -- process analysis, standardization, and worker discipline and
cooperation .5
As U.S. and European automakers learned from Toyota and other
Japanese firms who adopted similar approaches primarily during the 1960s
and 1970s, compared to rigid mass-production engineering and manufacturing,
a mixture of :superior process efficiency and flexibility in the mix of final
products made it possible for Japanese companies to compete in the world
marketplace on the basis of not simply product differentiation (high
reliability and perceived quality) or low cost, but with both. As Porter has
suggested, combining product differentiation and cost leadership is, at the
same time, very difficult for one firm to achieve but equally difficult for its
competitors; tc overcome. 6
Also somewhat beyond the vision of the initial product-process life-
cyle theorists is a fifth organizational model that appeared in Europe, the
U.S. and Japan initially during the 1960s and 1970s, with continued
refinements in the 1980s: highly automated and highly flexible manufacturing
systems (FMSi that can produce a variety of products quickly and with little
or no financial penalty associated with low volumes, once a firm has
invested in developing the system. In these environments, which rely heavily
on tools nd systems such as computer-aided design and manufacturing
(CAD,/CAM), the ratio of time and money companies once devoted to purely
production activities is pushed back into product engineering and
7
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development of systems capable of automating a large number of
manufacturing activities. The result is the productivity, control, and quality
of a highly atomated factory, plus the capability to produce a variety of
products or introduce innovative designs or processes quickly and at low
cost. This evolution beyond the Ford or "American" style of rigid mass
production has been discussed in the work of Piore and Sabel, Jaikumar,
Meredith, and others. 7
The ypc.logy of basic production organizations described above, and
their accompanying characteristics and tradeoffs, can be summarized as
follows:
TYPOLOGY OF BASIC PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS
TYPE 1: Job-Shop/Craft Environments(focu:; orn customized products, general purpose equipment and highly
skilled labor, to maximize flexibility in design; full but unsystematic
integration of design and production; high margins from unique designs
make cost control less a priority)
TYPE 2: E atc!,-Operations
(focu; or' low-volume multiple products, but still much customizing and
high margins)
TYPE 3: .igidI Mass Production and Engineering(focus. on higher volumes and few products; standardized product
t:echnolocj:y makes simple, fixed automation and division of de-skilled
labor tasks highly economical; specialization can lead to organizational
separati:.n of design from manufacturing, with engineering sub-
organizations focusing on product development and manufacturing sub-
orgarniza. ions on mass-production)
TYPE 4: .ow-- Automation Flexible Mass-Production
I(focu!; on process and components standardization and medium to high
but ont:rolled volumes, less rigid automation and more flexible
equipmer.t (rapid set-up times), and less specialized workers; these
facilitate small-lot production, to combine the benefits of product
varie:y ssociated with batch-operations or job shops with cost and
quality ontrois, and productivity increases, of mass-production
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environm ents)
TYPE 5: :l.!sh-Level Automation, Flexible Production
(focus on design of a system capable of fully integrating and
automatir 'g product-engineering and manufacturing functions, so that
high-volume and stable product designs (within certain parameters) are
no longer important; this captures the benefits of both job-shop
flexiblity in product differentiation with the productivity, precision, and
standardized high quality and low costs of mass-production-type
automation).
Analogies for Engineering
These categorizations seem most applicable to organizations
manufacturing "hard" goods such as automobiles, as companies choose
different arenas in which to compete, from fully customized products to
mass-prodiucerd items. Back in the development part of the organization,
however, there also appear to be choices of a similar nature. For example,
if a customer needs a product, whether it is an automobile, a machine tool,
a semicon.:lucxor chip, or a software program, there are basically three
options: obtain a fully customized product -- from a vendor or an in-house
department:; cbtain a standardized or "packaged" product; obtain a semi-
customizedl product (from a vendor or an in-house department that
customizes a purchased standardized product). It follows that vendors should
have three corresponding options: 1) sell a customized product; 2) sell a
standardized product; 3) customize a semi-standardized product. Companies
in the bsiness of making these items then have several options for
managing the process of product development as well as manufacturing--
and these nighlt very well parallel those of a manufacturing organization, as
outlined blow.
9
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BASIC STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS
STRATEGY 1:
Customize each development
process for each product
("Job-Shop" Analogy)
STRATEGY 2:
Customize some processes
and sell more than one
of each product
("Batch" Analogy)
STRATEGY 3:
Standardize the processes
and the products
("Rigid Factory" Analogy)
STRATEGY 4:
Standardize the processes but
customize the end products,
with large-factory efficiency
("Flexible Factory" Analogy)
STRATEGY 5:
Customize the products but
automate the processes
("FMS" Analogy)
IMPLEMENTATION:
Maximize the capability of the
organization to produce a unique
product that will capture a high price
from at least one customer
IMPLEMENTATION: 
Maximize the capability of the
organization to produce a unique
product that will capture a large
share of the market
IMPLEMENTATION:
Maximize the capability of the
organization to produce a product
with standard features at the lowest
possible price
IMPLEMENTATION:
Maximize the capability of the
organization to produce semi-custom
products at a low price through
the use of as many standardized
procedures and inputs as possible
IMPLEMENTATION:
Maximize the capability of the
organization to produce customized
products at a low price through the
use of highly flexible process
techniques and/or automation
Good examples of these strategies can be found in the Japanese auto
industry, where Toyota and other local automakers developed an integrated
engineering and manufacturing approach that resembles Strategy 4.
Extremely low sales in Japan after World War II (total Japanese car and
truck production in 1950 equalled merely one day. of U.S. output), despite
10
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nearly a dozen producers by 1960, as well as rising demand for a variety of
models, encouraged Toyota and then other Japanese automakers to focus first
on developing efficient design and production methods for small lots or
batches, and then on increasing product variety -- in effect, end-product
customization. As volumes increased, companies gained more efficiencies
through larger scales of operations, making it possible for. Japanese
automakers to combine remarkable productivity levels in manufacturing with
a variety of products tailored to domestic and export markets. The history
of Toyota from around 1948 through the 1970s reveals, however, that the
company went through a long series of steps -- first introducing more
controls over ts engineering and manufacturing outputs, and then gradually
adding more product variety, volumes, and automation. But the eventual
result wa,; a more flexible factory model -- actually, -an integrated
engineerin; and manufacturing philosophy and organization -- than had
existed pr;viously:
TOYOTA P'RODUCT-PROCESS DEVELOPMENT
1. Low Volume, Low Variety Production
O)rganizational Centralization
2. Product 'Variety Limits
3 Volume L.eveling
4. Process Analysis/R&D
5. Establishment of Good Process Techniques
6. Standardization of Procedures
7. Standardization of Components
8. Externsion of Worker Job Routines
9. Volume I creases
10 Select:ive Introduction of Automation/More Process RD
11. Increase in End-Product Variety
12. More Automation/Process R&D
13. blore Prcduct Variety
14. Extensionr of the System to Other Locations
15. C(:onti,iua3 Improvement
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Industries such as machine tools, aircraft, specialty motors, construction
or agricultural equipment, and defense systems have faced similar problems
as Toyota and the Japanese automakers once did. Their design and
manufacturing organizations might also be viewed as moving from Strategy 1
or 2 to Strategies 4 and especially 5, bypassing Strategy 3. Customers of
these products often require unique or customized features, for different
types of applications. As a result, the producers need to design and make
products in small batches, with varying degrees of customization. Since
development often requires high levels of precision and highly skilled,
expensive workers, products may become expensive. This is a major reason
why manufacturers of machine tools, aircraft, specialty motors, construction
or agricultural equipment, and defense systems have led in the installation or
development of FMS technology, which provides the capability of producing
products with the precision and efficiency of an automated factory and the
customizing capability of a job shop or batch-processing organization.8
In semiconductor design, one finds as well a movement from Strategies
1 or 2 to Strategies 4 and 5, as companies have attempted to respond to
various customer needs more effectively by exploiting new technological
capabilities. For specific applications, design times can range from a few
hours for a standard chip to years for fully customized chips, with
comparable differences in costs. As demand for application-specific chips
has risen, and customer needs have become more predictable, companies have
succeeded in developing highly automated equipment to design standardized
gate arrays, and then standardized modules or cells, to gain traditional
large-scale efficiencies -- in engineering as well as in manufacturing.
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Companies then add the necessary customization to their products toward the
end of the processing cycle, allowing producers to meet different customer
needs at competitive prices. 9
Another concept usually associated with manufacturing that has brought
increasing standardization and rationalization to engineering activities is
group technology. The basic idea here is to maximize efficiencies by
grouping together similar parts, processes, problems, or tasks, using some
sort of classification and coding scheme. Job shops and batch-processing
organizations tend to treat each part they design as unique in both design
and manufacturing. But, over time, there often appear many similarities in
shapes and processes among at least some of the components in production,
allowing various companies to report benefits in both cost and quality
through increased standardization, rationalization, and simplicity. In general,
this seems to be because performing similar activities together avoids wasted
time in ch.anging from one activity to another; standardizing closely related
activities and focusing only on distinct differences avoids unnecessary
duplication of effort and places more effort where it is most important;
efficiently storing and retrieving information related to recurring problems
reduces search time for the information as well as eliminates the need to
solve a problem again. 10
I..arge-scile software development is a particularly appropriate case to
study the application of manufacturing-type strategies to engineering
because, ot only is this a growing field providing a product essential to
many industries, but it is often considered to involve primarily design rather
13
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than manufacturing activities. This can be seen in a commonly cited
breakdown of life-cycle cost components for software: 10% of total costs
devoted to requirements definition, specifications, and design; 7% to coding;
15% to testing; and as much as 70% to maintenance, which involves a
repetition of earlier steps in order to produce an enhanced or corrected
design. 11 Moreover, while software has been evolving from a highly-skilled,
even artistic or craft-like activity into a discipline containing many
attributes of scientifically and mathematically-based engineering practices,
organizational and strategic rationalization seems to have proceeded slowly;
and demand for applications software in particular has continued to outpace
the capacity of companies to supply products. It seems well worth
determining why and how some firms have decided that software engineering
need not for'ever remain in a job-shop or, at best, a batch-mode of
operational management and efficiency.
II. THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN
Market Comparisons
If general tendencies are different for firms in different countries,
differences in industry structures and markets may be key to the
explanation. The software industries and markets in Japan and the U.S. do
exhibit some significant differences, to which firms might be reacting in
determining :nanagement strategies for software product and process
development .
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Both the U.S. and Japan had in common rapid market growth combined
with industry shortages of engineers. One U.S. estimate claimed that
software demand was growing at 20 to 30% annually while the supply of
programmers was increasing at the rate of merely 3 to 4% per year. 12 U.S.
companies needing customized applications software for mainframes typically
had a 3- to 4-year backlog. 13 Although some producers have attempted to
rationalize their operations along the lines of Strategy 4 or 5, it appears
that many U.S. software firms have also attempted to develop a few
excellent products and then sell them to large numbers of customers. This
can be seen in the fact that about 60% of U.S. software sales in a market
valued at $10 billion in 1982 and about $30 billion in the mid-1980s were of
standardized or "packaged" programs (Strategy 1 or 2).
The U.S. market was also becoming increasingly biased toward small
machines. About 15% of programs by value were for mainframes and office
or minicomputers; the rest were sold for personal computers.l 4 About 70%
of the total market consisted of systems software -- operating systems,
database management systems, telecommunications monitors, translators,
utilities -- and the rest applications software, ranging from spreadsheets for
personal computers to simulation packages for supercomputers. 1 5 Another
trend was the increasing power of personal computers, which in 1987 were
exhibiting similar speed and memory capabilities as mainframes of only a few
years earlier. This was increasing the size and complexity of programs even
for small machines and decreasing the historical borders of classifications
such as "personal," "mini," and "mainframe," as well as forcing software firms
to write programs for a range of machines, further exacerbating the shortage
15
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of software engineers.1 6
Japanese demand for software programmers was increasing at about 26%
per year, compared to growth in their supply of about 13% annually,
according to a 1986 estimate. This trend was expected to result in a
shortage of 600,000 Japanese programmers by 1990.17 This was less of a
shortage than in the U.S., although the Japanese software market was about
one-fifth the size of the U.S. market, including the estimated value of
systems software bundled with hardware (in the U.S., systems software was
usually sold separately). Japanese also wrote the vast majority of their
programs for large machines, since personal computers were slower to
diffuse. One, perhaps related effect, was that Japanese buyers continued to
demand unique products in high numbers. In fact, 95% of Japanese software
sales were customized programs almost exclusively for mainframes or
minicomputers, compared to about 30% in the U.S. 1 8
As discussed in the conceptual framework presented earlier in this
paper, the shortage of programmers and the demand for customization might
have persuaded at least some Japanese applications producers to standardize
or rationalize their development operations while continuing to produce
differentiated products for their customers. This would involve opting for
either Strategy 4 or 5. The techniques and technology to accomplish this
rationalization have been under development in both Japan and the U.S.
since the 1930s, when practicioners found that systematic methods of
analysis as well as concepts or techniques borrowed at least in part from
science and mathematics were useful in software environments. 1 9 There was
16
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surprising wide agreement in the academic and business communities by the
mid-1980s on what constituted "good" practices and tools. But disagreements
remained regarding the nature of software development (art vs. science vs.
engineering). 2 0 And, as the survey revealed, there are fairly wide
differences among firms in the degree to which similar practices and tools
were being emphasized.
The Field of Software Engineering
Led by engineers at firms such as IBM and TRW in the U.S., the
emerging discipline of "software engineering" has produced technologies and
methods such as high-level languages; automated support tools for design,
coding, documentation and testing; workbenches; prototyping techniques;
program libraries; quality metrics; designs relying on structured programming
and data or procedure abstractions; and techniques for project management
and control.2 1 Yet, for no doubt a variety of reasons, related or unrelated
to the nature of software technology or debates about its characteristics,
software management does not seem to have proceeded as rapidly or
confidently as tool and method technology that primarily facilities the work
of individual engineers or small groups. 22
In "hard" industries such as automobiles, machine tools, or even
semiconductors, there was a tendency of companies to shift more of their
emphasis to rationalizing or innovating in process technology once the
product technologies stabilized. This stabilization of product technology
allowed new production organizations, such as the mass-production factory,
17
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to emerge and dominate an industry, at least until market demands changed
and competitors discovered superior modes of production to meet the new
requiremerits . 23 A key question engineering organizations might ask is
whether their product technologies exhibit enough stabilization to consider
further rationalization of the development process.
With regard to software, one might argue that product technology is
stabilizing While operating systems and applications like banking programs
have han,.'ed in complexity as, say, cars have, distinct product types have
appeared and become rather standardized in terms of functions and customer
expectations. The huge share of the U.S. software market (nearly 60%)
devoted to non-customized "packaged" software indicates clearly that this is
taking place. 2 1 Furthermore, the survey reveals that many managers in both
the U.S. nd Japan, especially in applications facilities, found much of the
software they were developing as reusable in-arecent sample year and some
reuse: large percentages of code (see table below).25
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PERCENT OF CODE CONSIDERED REUSABLE AND REUSED
Notes: Asterisk (*) indicates author's estimate based on averaging of
multiple company statistics.
% Rework Allowed refers to the maximum percentage of code a
manager would allow to be reworked before the module would no
longer be classified as reused.
% .Reusable
Applications Producers
Japanese
Japanese
Japanese
Japanese
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
15
35
40
30
5
20
50*
5
15
1
10
25
75
% Reused
8
55
20
10
15
15
10
5
10
1
10
50
18
% Rework
Allowed
50/60
40
50
40/50
25
50
10
10
Systems Producers
Japanese
Japanese
US
US
85
40
15
35
50*
40
10
25
25
Source: Survey responses from managers at Fujitsu, Toshiba, Hitachi, NT&T,
Nippon Electronics Development, Unisys/SDC, EDS, TRW, Boeing
Aerospace (systems and applications), Honeywell, Computervision,
Martin Marietta (Denver and Maryland), Hughes Aircraft,
Unisys/Sperry, Data General, and IBM.
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"Factory" Approaches in the U.S. and Japan
At the operational level, one way to rationalize a complex processing
activity activity is by centralizing the locus of activities to gain certain
economies of scale or scope; providing RD for the relevant process
technologies; and integrating technologies with policies defining tools,
methods, or procedures in a way to enhance organizational productivity. 26
Historically, production organizations with these characteristics emerged
during the 18th and 19th centuries in Britain, Europe and the United States
in the textile industry and then gun-making. They were called "factories,"
and they institutionalized several innovations intended to raise worker
productivity and lower unit costs: integration of various production
processes in a large, centralized facility; close physical coordination of the
flow of each process; division and specialization of labor; mechanization of
tasks; and rigid accounting controls. 27
The term "factory" for software is somewhat of a misnomer, in that
software development includes planning, engineering (design), production
(coding and testing), and maintenance (redesign) activities; and many
software facilities are engaged in customizing products or developing unique
products such as operating systems or data base systems. The first
American company to attempt to implement a factory model for customized
applications software was the System Development Corporation (SDC), then a
Burrough's subsidiary (now part of Unisys) that had been one of the
contractors of the SAGE air defense system when it was part of the Rand
Corporation. SDC developed real-time software primarily for government
contracts, and in the mid-1970s put together an integrated set of tools
20
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(program library, project databases, on-line interfaces, and automated support
systems for verification, documentation, etc.) that were supposed to work in
conjunction with a set of standardized procedures and management policies
for program design and implementation. This system SDC copyrighted under
the name The. Software Factory."
SDC engineers were particularly interested in dealing with five common
problems in software development; analogies to these appeared in other
engineering and manufacturing activities as well: (1) Lack of discipline and
repeatability or standardized approaches to the development process, with the
result that SC was continually reinventing products and processes, and not
becoming as proficient at development or project control as managers
wanted. (2)i Lack of an effective way to visualize and control the
production process, as well as to measure before the project was completed
how well code implemented a design. 3) Difficulty in accurately specifying
performanc::e rquirements before detailed design and coding, and recurrence
of di;agrr;em-nts on the meaning of certain requirements, or changes
demanded by the customer. 4) Lack of standardized design, management, and
verification tools, making it necessary to reinvent these from project to
project. 5) Little capability to reuse components, despite the fact that many
application areas used similar logic and managers believed that extensive use
of off-the-s-ielf software modules would significantly shorten the time
requi red for oftwarTe development. 28
There', were serious implementation problems with the factory concept as
applied at SD:. As discussed in another paper, project managers did not
21
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like giving up control of development efforts to a centralized facility; there
was not always a steady flow of similar work into the factory; programmers
seemed to dislike the rigid environment and reusing code from a central
source. Overall, it seems that management attempted to impose the factory
infrastructure of tools and methods on both managers and programmers
without preparing both personnel and the workflow to the new system. In
any case, SDC gradually abandoned the factory experiment by the late 1970s,
although it has continued to use many of the factory procedures and at least
one of the tools.2 9
In contrast, the factory concept has found more of a following in
Japan, beginning with Hitachi's opening of the world's first facility called a
software factory in 1969 and then Toshiba's in 1977.30 Key managers
responsible for software development at these two firms as well as at NEC
have also indicated they were influenced by SDC attempts to discipline
software development as early as the 1960s. 3 1 This does not mean that the
Japanese were choosing to develop radically different technology; in fact, a
recent survey comparing U.S. and Japanese software practices and various
other articles maintain that the type of technology for software development
is quite similar in Japan and the U.S. The difference this survey found was
that Japanese firms appeared to be developing and using recommended tools
and methods more systematically than their U.S. counterparts. 3 2
In general, however, as in the manufacture of automobiles and other
products, the Japanese software producers appear to have set high standards
for process analysis and defect control, as well as for general production
22
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management and productivity. Reports on recent developments in software
engineering at large Japanese firms seem to fall into four categories, all of
which writers have assumed represent good practice and a departure from
U.S. norms: 3 3
attempts to exploit Japanese traditions of teamwork, discipline, and
individual attention to quality by developing software tools and planning
or reporting systems that facilitate group programming and a teamwork
methodology throughout the software life cycle.
quality control techniques designed to catch bugs early, before they
become difficult to fix.
national and company efforts to improve software quality and
productivity through reusability of software modules and automation of
software production (code generation).
construction of large, factory-li e facilities to integrate the entire
process of software development.
Government and private surveys have also expressed concern about the
impact of these developments on what many Americans have felt was an
unassailable U.S. lead in software engineering skills. For example, a U.S.
Department of Commerce report asserted in 1984 that the Japanese were
more "disciplined" and thus were placing more emphasis on developing tools
and "factories," while U.S. programmers suffered from viewing software
development too much like a "craft":
The Japanese have... made impressive gains in the development of
software tools and have encouraged their widespread use within their
software factories to boost productivity... By contrast, while the United
States is developing software engineering technology, the use of tools
in U.S. firms is quite limited... Many U.S. software companies consider
programming a craft and believe the future strength of the industry lies
in its creativity rather than a 5 disciplined approach to software
development as do the Japanese.
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A 1985 artick in the Electronic Engineering Times similarly claimed the
Japanese Rweere more effectively utilizing team or group approaches, as well
as developing unique team-oriented software tools, while Americans were
were beco:ming overly dependent on small groups and highly skilled
individuals:
"[T]Ile approach to software technology taken by major developers in
Japan, such as NEC, Fujitsu Ltd, and Hitachi Ltd., universally strive to
harness that tradition of excellent teamwork... Each of these developers
has automated versions of planning and reporting systems that enforce
a strict teamwork methodology through the complete life cycle of a
computer program -- from planning to design to maintenance, and
without coding, since high-level language-source codes are automatically
produced from the design documents.
... tlnti now, the Japanese have been hampered in their software
development efforts by a lack of team-oriented tools. The tools
borrowed from the United States simply do not fit the Japanese culture
because they put too much control in too few hands.
In Anmerik:a, industrial software development is generally done in groups
that are as small as possible to minimize the communication problems
amon!g reople. That makes the knowledge of each individual
programmner a critical factor to the success of any software-
clevelopment project. But...that is just not tolerable in the Japanese
culture.
As a consequence, the Japanese have had to perform basic research into
software tools that can be wielded by many hands at once. N~obody
else was going to develop group-programming tools for them."
Another trend perhaps was the potential for rapid dissemination of
software tools and expertise in Japan, because industry activity was so
concentrated at the top four computer manufacturers -- Fujitsu, NEC,
Hitachi, and Toshiba. The basic industry consisted of 450 companies
registered as members of the Japan Information Service Industry
Association. 3 ' But most of these were extremely small in terms of
employees and revenues, although 17 companies producing software as their
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major business had 1000 or more employees in 1983.38 An estimated 50 of
all the software Japan developed came included (bundled) with large and
medium-size computer hardware manufactured primarily by the top four
computer companies. NT&T and Mitsubishi Electric were the only other
significant Japanese producers of systems software, excluding subsidiaries of
U.S. firms. 3 9
Not only did NEC, Fujitsu, and Hitachi rank one, two, and three in
software revenues in Japan. 4 0 These three companies have also transferred
much of their technology and development tools to subsidiaries, which ranged
in size from a few dozen employees to nearly 2500. Fujitsu, for example,
had 52 software subsidiaries in 1986, Hitachi 24, and NEC 21.41 Two of the
top five independent software producers in Japan, Nippon Business
Consultants (#1 in sales in fiscal 1983) and Hitachi Software Engineering
(#5), were Hitachi subsidiaries.42
Japanese computer companies, like Japanese firms in other industries,
despite some similarities, were still not monolithic in their approaches to
software development. 43 While Hitachi and Toshiba claimed publicly to
operate "software factories," NEC and Fujitsu did not. There was not even
a consensus at NEC and Fujitsu that a "factory" was an appropriate model
for software development; at least some managers at these firms felt
software was essentially a "design" activity unsuitable for "mass
production. " 4 4 Fujitsu also called its large-scale applications facility an
"Information Processing Systems Laboratory." Nevertheless, NEC and Fujitsu
still produced software centralized, tool-intensive environments housed in
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large facilities officially designated as "factories." And, like Hitachi and
Toshiba, both companies appeared to be rigorously applying to software
hardware-type statistical quality control, inspection practices, and quality
circles. 4 5
Since the dissolution of SDC's Software Factory, SDC and other
American firms appear to have preferred designations such as "laboratory" or
"systems development center," or no label at all, to designate their software
organizations.4 6 Yet many U.S. companies, such as TRW, IBM, Boeing,
appear to have gone considerably beyond the SDC Software Factory
experiment in studying tools and methods for design and testing, as well as
programming environments and managerial aspects of large-scale software
production. 47 Yet to be answered, however, is the question of what degree
of integration and standardization among people, systems, functions, tools,
methods, inputs, and the like seems appropriate to distinguish a "software
factory" from simply a large facility housing discrete groups of engineers. It
seems plausible as well that at least some U.S. firms have recogized a need
to rationalize software development and today operate in a manner
sufficiently integrated, standardized, and strategic so that they might as well
be called "flexible factories," especially is measured by the ideals SDC
originally set out to implement.
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Ill. THE SURVEY
Methcdoi:gy.
The survey was designed to determine where U.S. and Japanese
companies stand in relation to a set of criteria suggested by the SDC
Software Factory experiment. In particular, it was thought that mapping
companies along the spectrum that emerged would make it possible to
examine if several hypotheses about software organizations and the U.S.-
Japan comparison, described later in this section, were true or not.
Major producers of large-scale systems and applications software in
Japan and the U.S. were identified through public literature and discussions
with indu;'try experts. All the Japanese firms contacted filled out the
survey; the vast majority of U.S. firms contacted also decided to participate.
To improve thet comparability of responses, the survey was sent to managers
of (1) facilities: producing operating systems or network systems software for
mainframes or minicomputers; and (2) facilities producing real-time
applications or control programs for mainframes or minicomputers. Two
managers t ach type of facility either responsible for overall software
engineering management or with sufficient experience to present an overview
of practices for the entire facility, were asked to respond. About half the
companies ret:Jrned two completed surveys for each type of facility; these
answers were averaged. Questions and answers were often clarified through
discussions with the respondents. While the Japanese sample size is small,
the surve ed firms account for the vast majority of software written and
sold in Jal:an; as indicated in the previous section.
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The survey criteria, and answers key, were as follows:
SURVEY ANSWERS KEY:
4 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS FULLY USED OR ENFORCED
3 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS FREQUENTLY USED OR ENFORCED
2 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS SOMETIMES USED OR ENFORCED
1 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS SELDOM USED OR ENFORCED
0 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS NOT USED
1. TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Centralization of development for a distinct software product family
(such as an operating system like IBM's VM or DEC's VAX/VMS) in a
single location or directly linked sites operating as an integrated unit,
rather than decentralizing development in independent sites.
B. A uniform set of specification, design, coding, testing, and
documentation procedures used among project groups within a
centralized facility or across different sites working on the same
product family to facilitate standardization of practices and/or division
of labor for programming tasks and related activities.
C. A centralized program library system to store modules and
documentation.
D. A central production or development data base connecting programming
groups working on a single product family to track information on
milestones, task completion, resources, and system components, to
facilitate overall project control and to serve as a data source for
statistics on programmer productivity, costs, scheduling accuracy, etc.
E. Project data bases standardized for all groups working on the same
product components, to support consistency in building of program
modules, configuration management, documentation, maintenance, and
potential reusability of code.
F. A specific group or groups designated to develop and disseminate
methodologies and tools to automate tasks such as requirements
specification and design, coding, documentation, system testing and
debugging, as well as to facilitate standardization of practices and
division of labor, and effective managerial control over all programming
activities.
G. A system interface providing the capability to link support tools,
project data bases, the centralized production data base and program
libraries.
H. Automated or semi-automated integration of applicable data from
28
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support tools and development data bases with management control
systems (project data bases and the central production data base), for
each phase of program development; and the utilization of this
capability to facilitate budgeting, forecasting, maintenance, and overall
life-cyle cost control on current and future projects.
II. METHODOLOGY POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Use of a standardized design language
B. Use of a standardized module-specification language
C. Use of a standardized coding language
D. Emphasis on high-level abstraction (data-type or procedure abstraction;
object rather than variable orientation)
E. Planning for maintainability at the module-design level
F. Planning for reusability at the module-design level
G. Planning for portability at the module-design level
H. Monitoring of how much code is being reused
I. "Layering" of reused modules from the program library, along with
newly written code, to create new programs
J. Cataloging for the program library of common functional modules (e.g. a
date 'verification routine)
K. Cataloging for the program library of data abstraction modules (e.g.
table or linked-list managers)
L. Writing of documentation to accompany modules placed in the program
library
M. Requirement that, if changes are made in the code of a module in the
program library, the documentation must also be changed
N. Formal management promotion (beyond the discretion of individual
project managers) that new code be written in modular form with the
intention that modules (in addition to common subroutines) will then
serve as reusable "units of production" in future projects
O. Formal management promotion (beyond the discretion of individual
project managers) that, if a module designed to perform a specific
function (in addition to common subroutines) is in the program library
system, rather than duplicating such a module, it should be reused
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION QUESTIONS(These were confidential; some results are reported in tables and the notes,
without revealing company names.)
Data an Hyotheses
The basic data from the surveys is summarized below, followed by the
hypotheses tested and the conclusions from the data analysis. The number of
NEC facilities included in the sample is large but also reflects its role in the
Japanese softw/are market. NEC was the largest producer of software among
the Japanese computer manufacturers and had approximately 50% more
software revenues than Fujitsu (#2), and three times that of Hitachi (#3) in
1985.
SURVEY RESULTS: DATA SUMMARY TABLE
I - Technological Infrastructure (32=100%)
II = Policy/Methodology Infrastructure (60=100%)
111 = Total Factory Model (92=100%)
@ indicates two responses and averaged or joint responses.
n = 38
APliratns Means 69 62 65
Japani3se (*) 71 72 72
U.S. 67 55 60
_Sstens Means 75 68 70
Jailanese (*) 82 78 80
U.S. 69 57 61
OVERALL MEANS 71 64 67
JA PA1 ESE (*) 76 75 75
U.S. 68 56 60
30
· __ II___
COMPANY/FACI LITY
Applications
*NEC@
*Toshiba Software Factory
*NEC Information Service
*NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.@
*Hitachi Omori Works
*Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab.@
*Nippon Systemware
*Nippon Business Consultant
*Hitachi Software Engineering@
*Nippon Electronics Development
TRW
Unisys/Sperry@
Unisys/SDC
Control Data@
Martin Marietta/Maryland
Hughes Aircraft
Boeing Aerospace@
AT&T Bell Labs
Cullinet
Martin Marietta/Denver
Electronic Data Systems@
Honeywell/Defense Systems@
Draper Laboratories@
Computervision@
97 83 88
91 72 78
72 77 75
84 67 73
59 76 70
83 63 70
84 53 64
72 58 63
64 59 61
69 43 52
61 43 49
44 42 42
34 17 23
28 25 26
Systems
*NEC/Switching Systems
*NEC/Operating Systems
*Toshiba Software Factory
*NEC Software
*Hitachi Software Works@
*Fujitsu Numazu Factory@
*NT&T Comm. Info. Proc. Lab.@
98%
92
84
84
78
77
58
99%
92
87
87
70
68
48
99%
92
86
86
73
71
51
Control Data@
IBM Endicott
Data General Westboro & N.C.
Boeing Aerospace®
Unisys/Sperry®
IBM Raleigh
DEC (VMS)
78 67 71
78 62 67
61 63 62
77 53 61
61 62 61
84 43 58
41 48 46
89%
84
81
81
78
77
72
56
53
41
89%
87
88
77
73
73
70
67
50
48
89%
86
86
78
75
75
71
63
51
46
31
------· ------ --- xlRerrrsra
I III
RANKINGS: TIECHNOLOGY/FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE
8 Questions; 32=100%
Key:
A.J. = Applications Japan
A.U. = Applications U.S.
S.J. = Systems Japan
S.U. = Systems U.S.
* = Japanese firms
COMPANY/FACI LITY
S.J *NEC/Switching Systems
A.U. TRW
S.J. *NEC/Operating Systems
A.U. Unisys/Sperry
A.J. *NEC
A.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
A.U. Boeing Aerospace
S.U. IBM Raleigh
S.J. *NEC Software
A.U. Hughes Aircraft
A.J. *NEC Information Service
A.J. *NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
A.J. *Hitachi Omori Works
S.U. IBM Endicott
A.U. Control Data
A.J. *Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab
S.U. Control Data
S.J. *Hitachi Software Works
S.J. *Fujitsu Numazu Factory
S.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.J. *Nippon Systemware
A.U. AT&T Bell Labs
A.U. Unisys/SDC
A.U. Martin Marietta/Denver
A.U. Cullinet
S.U. Data General Westboro & N.C.
A.U. Electronic Data Systems
S.U. Unisys/Sperry
A.U. Martin Marietta/Maryland
S.J. *NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
A.J. *Nippon Business Consultant
A.J. *Hitachi Software Engineering
A.U. Honeywell/Defense Systems
S.U. DEC (VMS)
A.J *Nippon Electronics Development
A.U. Draper Laboratories
A. U. Computervision
98
97
92
91
89
84
84
84
84
84
83
81
81
78
78
78
77
77
78
77
77
72
72
72
69
64
61
61
61
59
58
56
53
44
41
41
34
28
Flexible
Factory
Approach
Job Shop
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RANKINGS: POLICY/METHODOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE
15 Questions, 60=100%
COMPANY/'FACLITY
S.J. *N E:C/Switching Systems
S. J. *NEC/Operating Systems
A. J. *NEC
A.J. *NEC nformation Service
A.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S.J. *NEC Software
A.U. TRW
A.U. Urisys/SDC
A.J. *NT&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
A.U. Martin, Marietta/Maryland
A.J. *Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab.
A. J. *Hitachi Omori Works
A.U. Unisys/Sperry
S.J. *Hitachi Software Works
A.J. *Nippon Systemware
S.J. *Fujitsu Numazu Factory
A.J. *Nippcn Business Consultant
A. U. Control Data
S.U. Ccntrol Data
S.U. Data General Westboro & N.C.
A.U. Hughes Aircraft
S. U. IBM Endicott
S.U. Ur isys/Sperry
A. U. Cit Ilinet
A.U. A'T&T Bell Labs
S.U. Boeinqg Aerospace
A.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.J. *Hitaclii Software Engineering
S.J. *N'&T Comm. & Info. Proc. Lab.
S.U. DEC (VMS)
A. J *Nippcn Electronics Development
S.U. IBM Raleigh
A. U. Martir: Marietta/Denver
A.U. Electronic Data Systems
A.U. Honeywell/Defense Systems
A. U. Computervision
A.U. Draper Laboratories
99
90
89
88
87
87
87
83
77
77
76
73
73
72
70
70
68
67
67
67
63
63
62
62
59
58
53
53
50
48
48
48
43
43
43
42
25
17
Flexible
Factory
Approach
Job Shop
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RANKINGS: TOTAL FACTORY MODEL
23 Questions, 92=100%
COMPANY /FACILITY
S.J. *NEC/Switching Systems
S.J. *NEC/Operating Systems
A.J. *NEC
A.U. TRW
A.J. *NEC Information Service
A.J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S. J. *Toshiba Software Factory
S. J. *NEC Software
A.J. *NT&T Comm. Info. Proc. Lab.
A. U. Unisys/Sperry
A.U. Unisys/SDC
A.J. *Hitachi Omori Works
A.J. *Fujitsu Info. Proc. Sys. Lab.
S.J. *Hitachi Software Works
A.U. Control Data
S.J. *Fujitsu Numazu Factory
A.J. *Nippen Systemware
A.U. Martin Marietta/Maryland
S.U. Control Data
A.U. Hughes Aircraft
S. U. IBM Endicott
A.U. Boeing Aerospace
A.J. *Nippon Business Consultant
A.U. AT&T Bell Labs
S.U. Data General Westboro N.C.
S. U. Boeing Aerospace
A. U. Cullinet
S. U. Unisys/Sperry
S.U. IBM Raleigh
A.U. Martin Marietta/Denver
S.J. *NT&T Comm. C. Info. Proc. Lab.
A.J. *Hitachi Software Engineering
A.U. Electronic Data Systems
S.U. DEC (VMS)
A.J *Nippon Electronics Development
A.U. Honey)iwell/Defense Systems
A. U. Computervision
A.U. Draper Laboratories
99
91
89
88
86
86
86
86
78
78
75
75
75
73
71
71
71
70
70
70
67
64
63
63
62
61
61
61
58
52
51
51
49
46
46
42
26
23
Flexible
Factory
Approach
Job Shop
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PROJECT CONTROL AND QUALITY ANALYSIS4 8
KEY:
A = Avg Bugs Reported By Users Per 1000 Lines of Debugged Code
B = Average Percent of Projects Late in a Recent Year
C = Average Percent of Projects Finished within 5% of Budget
F = % of Total Factory Model Criteria
(HH = 80% or above; H = 70 to 79%; M = 58 to 69%; L = below 58%)
* = Author's Estimate
FACILITY A
A.J. 0.13
A.U. --
A.J. 0.15
A.J. 0.04
A.J. 0.7
S.J. 0.02
S.J. 0.01*
A.U. --
A.U. 0.1
A.U. 1.0
A.U. 2.2
S.U. 0.4
AVG. 0.48
A. U. 15.0
A.U. --
S.U. --
S.U. --
S.U. 20.0
AVG. 17,5
S.J. 0.2
A.J. 0.07
A.J. 1.0
A.U. 10.0
A.U. 17.5
A.U. --
A.U. --
A.U. --
AVG. 5.75
COUNTRY
Japan
U.S.
AVERAGES
0.26
8.3
B
5
0
0
14
5
75
0
50
85
20
.2
50
20
50
50
7
15
28
50
50
90
AMh
5%
43%
C
95
50
100
50
10
100
80
5
20
50
85
50
85
50
0
90
80
20
0
0
32~
50%
51%
F
HH
HH
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
M
M
M
M
M
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
H
M
Source: Companies responding were Toshiba, NT&T, Fujitsu, Nippon
Electronics Development, Hitachi Software Engineering, Hitachi,
Unisys/SDC and Unisys/Sperry, EDS, TRW, Boeing, Honeywell,
Computervision, Martin Marietta (Denver and Md.), Hughes Aircraft,
Cullinet, Draper, Data General, IBM, Boeing, Control Data.
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REUSBILITY OF CODE AND THE FACTORY MODEL
% Factory
(HH = 80%
= % of Total Factory Model Criteria
or above; H = 70 to 79%; M = 58 to 69%; L = below'58%)
% Reused % Factory
55 HH
50 H
35 H
18 H
15 HH
10 H
10 H
8 H HH & H AYG.
S.U.
A.U.
S.U.
S.U.
S.J.
A.J.
A.U.
A.U.
A.U.
A.U.
OTHER
Japan
U.S.
40
10
10
0
M
M
M
M
50
20
15
10
5
1
L
L
L
L
L
L
AERAGES:
34
15
Applications 13
Systems 27
M AVG. = 15%
L AVG. = 17%
H
M
M
M
Source: Survey responses from managers at Fujitsu, Toshiba, Hitachi, NT&T,
Nippon Electronics Development, Unisys/SDC, EDS, TRW, Boeing
Aerospace (systems and applications), Honeywell, Computervision,
Martin Marietta (Denver and Maryland), Hughes Aircraft,
Unisys/Sperry, Data General, and IBM.
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Facility
A.J.
A.U.
S.J.
A. U.
A.U.
A.U.
A.U.
A.J. = 25%
-- - ---, I Ir I-
HYPOTHESIS 1:
Reasoning:
Result:
HYPOTHESIS 2:
Reasoning:
Result:
HYPOTHESIS 3:
Reasoning:
Result:
The scores of all the facilities in the sample should follow
a normal distribution.
If engineering organizations follow a similar spectrum of
strategies as found in manufacturing organizations, there
should be an observable spectrum of software facilities
roughly corresponding to job shops on the one end, and
flexible factories on the other, with most firms falling in
between in a normal distribution.
Accept hypothesis (kurtosis of 0.31 for the total model).
There should be no significant difference in the average
scores for technology infrastructure between Japanese and
U.S. facilities.
Although the literature suggests Japanese firms have been
more systematic in their use of software tools, it also
suggests that general development of software technology
has been largely similar in Japan and the U.S.
Accept hypothesis.
The average Japanese score for policy/methodology
infrastructure as well as the total score should be
significantly higher than the comparable U.S. scores.
The general literature and information from Japanese firms
suggests at least the larger Japanese computer
manufacturers have been more aggressive in pursuing a
disciplined, even a "factory" approach to software
development.
Accept hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Facilities farther toward the total factory model should
exhibit control characteristics one might expect to find in
a large factory-type organization: (A) fewer defects (bugs)
reported by users; (B) more precise roject scheduling;
and (C) tighter project cost control.
Result: (A) Accept hypothesis.
(B) Accept hypothesis.
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(C) Reject hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 5: Facilities that exhibit another characteristic one might
expect to find in a large factory-type organization--
greater use of standardized components, i.e. higher rates
of reusability of code -- should also score high on the
total factory criteria.
Result: Accept Hypothesis (Tentatively)
Comnents
Formal hypothesis tests for 1, 2, and 3, and other data summaries, can
be found in the Appendices.
Facilities or firms in the survey formed a statistically significant
normal distribution, moving upward from what has been equated to a job-
shop approach to a flexible-factory approach. Without Draper and
Computervision, the sample formed a near perfect normal distribution. With
or without the outliers, U.S. producers tended to be toward the middle
(batch mode) or bottom (job shop), and Japanese toward the top (flexible
factory).
In fact, despite the smaller size of the Japanese group, Japanese
companies accounted for 13 of the top 17 facilities ranked by the total
factory model criteria. NEC, which has not publicly adopted the "software
factory" concept, and its subsidiaries consistently led in the rankings. The
company that follows the NEC facilities, however, is a U.S. firm -- TRW.
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Also noteworthy is Toshiba, which develops both applications software and
mini-computer operating systems in the same facility. Since NEC, TRW,
Toshiba and other firms in the applications area customize their end
products, they, as well as systems producers, which develop unique operating
systems and other basic software, seem to fit the "flexbile factory" model
best. Another US applications producer making similar types of applications
programs to TRW -- Draper Laboratories -- scores lowest on all criteria.
Draper and Computervision were "outliers" in the sample but seem to fit the
highly creative job-shop model best. Both companies, especially Draper, are
known as producers of innovative software technology.
Only 4 of 17 Japanese facilities scored below the median for the total
factory criteria. Three of these -- Nippon Business Consultant, Hitachi
Software Engineering, and Nippon Electronics Development -- to a large
extent served as manpower suppliers to their parent firms (Hitachi in the
case of the first two and NEC in the case of the last one) and have not
focused on developing their own centralized program libraries, tool groups,
etc., but tend to use those of their parent firms.
The greatest deviations (more than 1.2 points) among firms were on the
following criteria: I.G (system interface linking tools and data bases); II. B
(standardized module specification language), H (monitoring of reused code),
J and K (cataloging modules for the program library). Japanese firms tended
to score higher on II. F (planning for reusability) and II. O (formal
management promotion that modules be reused from the program library), as
well as 11. J and K (see the Appendix for data summary). These were all
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policy or methodology measures, except for the tool-database interface.
With regard to hypotheses related to performance, the data is sketchy
for many firms, either because they did not track these measures or would
not report them in the survey. The data available shows that some firms
scoring low on the factory model, especially Japanese firms, still did well in
the control and quality measures. And some firms scoring high on the model
did not do so well in the control and quality measures. On average,
however, firms closer to the factory model scored better in quality (bug
control) and schedule control. This was not so obvious for cost control,
however, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 4c. The explanation may be
that many firms place a higher emphasis on completing a project on schedule
and with as few defects as possible, and they are willing to spend beyond
the budget to accomplish this, even in a "factory" environment.
On the other hand, additional information questions in the survey
indicate that performance criteria managers used were very similar in the
U.S. and Japanese firms, and they frequently mentioned meeting cost, quality
(reliability, specifications), and delivery targets (see Appendix). There was
somewhat more emphasis on "productivity" in the Japanese responses, but the
answers show that practically all the responding managers valued the basic
control measures one would expect to have in a disciplined factory or
engineering environment.
With regard to reusability, slightly less than half the firms or facilities
in the survey provided data on this; many admitted they did not track this
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measure. The data available suggests reuse is higher on average at firms
scoring 70% or above in the survey. The hypothesis that firms with high
reuse rates were also scoring high on the factory critieria seems acceptable,
although the evidence does not seem that strong, and the sample of
reporting firms is small. The five firms or facilities that reported reuse
rates of 35% or above averaged 73% on the technology criteria, 66% on the
policy criteria, and 68% overall, scores only 1 or 2 percentage points above
the sample means for these categories. Furthermore, not all firms scoring
high on the criteria were reusing lots of code, and not all firms scoring low
were poor in reusability. One firm with a very high rate (50%) scored in
the low range in the survey criteria, and another with 40% reusability
scored in the medium range. And one firm scoring over 80% in the criteria
reported a relatively low reusability rate (15%).
A disciplined, centralized environment may provide the technology and
methods to facilitate reusability, but managers still need to develop a
strategic commitment and program to optimize for this objective. High reuse
of code may also simply require that a facility focus its product lines. 50 In
addition, there are other ways of thinking about reusability other than
simple blocks of code. Toshiba, for example, keeps "reuse" figures for whole
program parts, as well as skeletons of modules, utility subsystems, and
support tools. 5 1 The topic of reusability will be treated in the case studies,
but is apparently a complex subject. It is also a topic dealt with extensively
in software engineering literature. 5 2
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IV: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
The factory model seems to bring benefits in quality control and
scheduling control. There is also considerable evidence that, through
reusability, enormous improvements in nominal productivity (lines of code
produced per programmer in a given time period) are also possible. Why
might this type of environment lead to improvements in engineering
management and performance? At the same time, how much might a
commitment to a factory rather than a laboratory model constrain the
"flexibility" of a firm, in terms of meeting different or changing customer
needs or accommodating technological change?
Scale to Justify Process R&D
Numerous tools and new methods or techniques have greatly improved
productivity in software, as well as in probably every other field of
engineering or manufacturing. Factory-type centralization, whether it is
geographic or electronic, and the guarantee that large numbers of
programmers will use the results of this investment, may be important for a
firm to justify the costs of continuous tool or method development and
funding of software-engineering groups. In NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba, for
example, specific engineering departments have been formed to keep track of
the latest developments in software engineering, and experiment with their
own ideas and tools. They also have the authority and responsibility to
introduce what they decide are "good practices" into facilities or subsidiaries
housing thousands of programmers.
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The degree of centralization of firms in the sample varied; NEC, for
example, was more decentralized than Hitachi, though more standardized. In
all, 17 of the 38 facilities in the survey responded with answers of 4.0 or
3.5 to question I.F (emphasis on having a specific software engineering tools
and practices group). Since only seven were from the U.S. (Boeing, TRW,
Unisys/SDC, Hughes, IBM, and Control Data), 60% of the Japanese respondees
and only one third of the U.S. respondees fully used this type of a group.
Institutionalizina Gnood Technoloy and Practice
It is not clear how centralized software development should be to meet
different customer needs or to prevent reaching a scale where the numbers
of people become too large to manage. In general, however, the basic tools
and procedures proposed in the survey criteria represent recommended "good
practice" in the software industry since at least SDC and the mid-1970s
Software Factory experiment. In a practical sense, one might thus view the
factory analogy as a strategy moving away from the undisciplined atmosphere
of a job shop or laboratory; and as a mechanism for management to
introduce and then require the use of "good" technologies and practices
throughout the appropriate parts of an organization, rather than leave
technical choices, tool development, and the like to individual discretion.
There may be some time lag in adopting the latest methods or tools, for
design, testing, reusability, maintenance, or whatever. But companies with
formal commitments to understand and then disseminate new process
technology may find that the knowledge and support levels of their average
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engineers, over time, are higher than in firms without comparable strategic
commitments to institutionalizing good technology and practices.
There is considerable evidence that factories in operation are promoting
skill development with extensive training programs.53 For example, dividing
up tasks or creating reusable and easily maintainable program parts as done
in several Japanese facilities require fairly sophisticated programming
concepts, such as data or procedure abstraction (otherwise no modules would
be reusable), or even "layering" of reused modules with newly written
code. 54 Toshiba has made abstraction central to its reusability strategy,
after realizing that the higher the level of abstraction in newly developed
code, the greater the number of reused modules and the greater the
frequency of their reuse. 5 5 Other Japanese firms were also paying
increasing attention to advanced programming concepts and systematically
teaching these to employees. 56
In addition, given the percentage of costs devoted to maintenance over
the lifetime of a software product, a firm should clearly want to maximize
its capabilities in this area. The factory environment should make it easier
for a company to enforce the key strategies usually cited for improving
software maintenance: clearly structured and modularized program designs
and coding; documentation sufficient so that future programmers can
understand the code, either to fix problems or to add functions; thorough
testing in order to catch bugs early, before they become too expensive and
perhaps impossible to fix; and use of already-generated (and tested) modules
of code. 57
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Process Efficiency Through Teamwork and Cmmunication
One of the key and frustrating conclusions in Brooks' testimony was
that the usefulness of "man-months" as a unit of measurement for estimating
time and manpower on software projects was a myth. His experience was
that adding people to a big project increased the amount of time that had to
be spent on training the new people and on communicating: "Men and
months are interchangeable commodities only when a task can be partitioned
among many workers with no communication among them... Adding more men
then lengthens, not shortens, the schedule." 5 8 Brooks thus came to prefer
only "a few good minds doing design and construction," rather than the 1000
or so people who worked on OS/360.5 9
But, if an integrated engineering and production environment -- a
"factory" as defined in this paper -- truly facilitated standardization, division
of labor, general use of good tools and practices, and effective
communication and teamwork, then it might make Brooks' observation much
less relevant, or at least increase the size of teams that can still be
effective and expand management alternatives for dealing with tardiness or
other problems. In fact, some managers of software factories in Japan
appear to have already realized this. The two individuals responsible for
developing Hitachi's software factories, when asked specifically what they do
when projects are late, admitted they do not actually follow Brooks' advice.
They dd people -- not just anybody, it is true, but their best available
people -- and this has proved to be more effective than not adding people,
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at least within their factory system. 6 0 Additional questions asked in the
survey, as well as public information, also indicate Japanese software
managers can estimate time and manpower needs with remarkable accuracy,
using historical databases relying on man/month measures.
Organizational Focus on Productivity and Quaity
One might argue that, when large numbers of people are involved, a
factory approach is the best way to bring together the necessary discipline
and integration of tools, procedures, and management controls to facilitate
standardization and other measures that allow managers and engineers to
increase productivity and the quality (lack of defects) of their products. On
the one hand, in facilities where managers have precise historical data on
the capabilities and tools their people possess, scheduling and cost estimates,
as well as personnel assignments should be more effective and easier to do.
In the case of Toshiba, an entire factory system has been specifically
maximized to deliver software on time and with minimal bugs, as well as
develop and reuse enormous amounts of code in customized products, leading
to lines-of-code productivity levels that far exceeded figures reported for
other firms.6 1 As in hardware factories, the productivity advantages of
reusing standardized components, or even procedures and tools, often go far
beyond simple output per worker on a given day, by saving engineering and
manufacturing man-hours in design, inspection, rework needed to correct
mistakes in the design or production of new components, and long-term
maintenance. 62
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The type of data base provided for in the factory environment on
numbers and types of bugs, as well as solutions, also provides a powerful
means of learning how to produce higher quality products within certain cost
targets. This type of defect and solution analysis, compbined with
productivity and cost estimation, has proved useful in numerous "hard"
industries such as automobiles. Product development teams often do the
same; and there is no reason why engeering organizations cannot continue to
improve their capabilities inthis area. In fact, evidence from the survey and
other articles from Japan indicate that it is possible to make significant
improvements in software quality control and that, as in other industries,
improving quality improves productivity. 6 3
Reducing Waste and Redundancy
A loosely managed engineering organization may indeed produce highly
creative products. But, if there are insufficient directions, communications,
and controls, different areas of the same organization might repeatedly
design similar or substitutable tools, procedures, or even components--
continually "reinvent the wheel" -- unnecessarily. A factory approach
would reduce this type of wasteful, redundant behavior on the part of both
managers and engineers. Companies need not leave the elimination of these
dysfunctions to chance alone.
For example, if an individual project manager insists it is too expensive
or time consuming for his or her group to write "inventory-quality software
modules" for program libraries, the organization will create these reusable
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assets only at the discretion of individuals, not as a matter of policy.
Creating an environment where standardized components can be developed
and reused seems to require that programmers design, code, and document
modules in a standardized way suitable for reusability; place them in an
easily accessible program library or central production data base; and then
reuse them consistently when writing new programs. These three
requirements are primarily matters of strategy and policy; and the third
seems essential to justify the efforts expended and tradeoffs involved in
standardization, documentation, and tool development.
Options for "Flexibility"
Nor do the technologies and techniques developed for the factory
environments have to static. Software-development tools and systems at
TRW, IBM, and SDC, as well as Hitachi and NEC have evolved incrementally
and changed rather significantly over time. The factory approach also need
not prevent an organization from pursuing, simultaneously or subsequently,
other organizational alternatives as its needs change. For example, should a
company want to experiment with different approaches to program design
and management, including bringing some development activities closer to
customers (decentralizing), it might set up separate departments or
subsidiaries.
Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC alone in recent years have established nearly
a hundred subsidiaries, to produce a variety of systems and applications
software in less restricted and less centralized environments. These firms
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also use R&D laboratories, such as NEC's Software Products Engineering
Laboratory or Hitachi's Systems Development Laboratory, to experiment with
different software technologies, separating these activities from "production"
activites in the software factories. Hitachi has also added new departments
for artificial intelligence and graphics to its systems software factory. In
addition, Japanese computer manufacturers have actively transferred their
factory-type programming systems and procedures to selected subsidiaries as
well as other company divisions.6 4
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CONC LUS;ON
1. THE I_ CTRUM EXISTS: TECHNOLOGY & POLICY
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that engineering
organizations do follow different approaches to mixing their use of
technology-based tools and strategy-based policies or methods in order to
rationalize their development activites. One might think of the distinction
between a factory and a job shop or laboratory as emerging from (1) a
management strategy determined to take advantages of scale, scope, or other
factors that might promote productivity and quality improvements; (2) a
technological infrastructure facilitating this strategy; and (3) a management-
policy and methodological infrastructure effectively integrating the
technology wii:h management objectives and people operating within or upon
the sstenm.
2. SOTlARE IS NO EXCEPTION
The second major conclusion is that software-development organizations
are not exceptions; they, too, exhibit different mixes of technology, policies,
and thus overall strategies and implementation effectiveness. There are
aspects of so:tware development that resemble both engineering (design,
maintenan: e) and manufacturing (coding, testing, assembly of exisitng
modules with new code); the entire development cycle of software is also
highly integrated and can be managed with varying degrees of discipline and
standardiztion, tool-intensity, and the like.
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Implicit or explicit proponents of the factory model appear to view this
approach as a strategic way to accommodate shortages of programmers and
the increasing demand for high-quality, often customized software. The
rationale one might use to justify this attempt at process improvement in
software engineering seems not so different from what many hardware-
producing organizations learned decades ago: As companies accumulate
knowledge and experience with product development and manufacturing, they
should be able to raise the development process from activities performed by
a few highly skilled individuals, operating in an environment analogous to a
hardware job-shop, to activities performed systematically by individuals in an
organization capable of historical learning, and perhaps some economies of
scope or scale of activities. The latter organization might also benefit from
the same advantages as any large-scale producer of products using carefully
analyzed, controlled, and standardized processes and inputs, and try to avoid
tradeoffs in product quality or features.
A recent article by an IBM manager on the evolution of software tools
and techniques argues as well that firms are increasingly recognizing it is
time to focus more on improving software process management. This asserts
that software engineering began in the 1960s with a management focus on
the individual engineer or programmer and a technological focus on
techniques such as structured programming. In the next stage, roughly
during the 1970s, experimental techniques became more formal methodologies,
such as stepwise refinement or'structured analysis, while managers turned
more of their attention to understanding better the processes involved in
each step of software life-cycle development (for example, from basic design
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through maintenance). 6 5 But only in the most recent stage (the 1980s), in
this interpretation, have companies pushed technology development more
toward improving software environments, and have managers shifted their
concerns to process-management issues. 66
A technological and management change in focus -- from the individual
and individual tools and techniques, to the organization and process
management -- reflects a movement one might expect with any product and
process as firms accumulate experience and as product technologies tend to
stabilize, as suggested earlier in this paper for software. Managers then can
become more "strategic" in two respects: recognizing the need to integrate
better technology, policies, and organizational structure with the overall
goals of the company or business unit; and perceiving these issues on levels
that distinguish long-term from short-term tradeoffs, in the sense that each
decision brings with it certain costs and benefits. 6 7 One of the objectives
of managers should also be to minimize tradeoffs, such as product cost
versus quality or functionality.
3. FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING CONCEPTS TOOLS IN ENGINEERING
As discussed earlier in this paper, it is a mistake to think of the
factory model as requiring rigidity in processes or products, or technological
features over time. Manufacturing and engineering organizations in "hard"
industries have found numerous ways to increase their ability to rationalize
development or production while enhancing their ability to introduce variety
in final products. Toyota's small-lot production system exploits
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standardization and discipline in components and procedures, as well as
easily changeable equipment, to produce a variety of products each in small
or large volumes with astounding levels of productivity. The histories of
how manufacturing firms have improved productivity and product quality may
themselves provide valuable lessons for engineering. In addition, group
technology practices; computer-aided design, engineering, and manufacturing
tools; as well as entire flexible manufacturing systems as in the machine-tool
industry, all incorporate concepts and technologies that are already being
applied in software but can be applied more widely, without necessarily
sacrificing the need for products to meet a variety of customer needs.
These themes, and the actual practices and technologies used in software
facilities that resemble flexible factories, are being treated in the case
studies accompanying this paper.
4. THE .JAPANESE MAY BE LEADING iN SOFTWARE MANAGEMENT
The survey indicated that Japanese firms or individual facilities, on
average, were considerably ahead of most U.S. firms in the application of
factory-type policies to large-scale software development. The United States
has seen its lead in product engineering and manufacturing skills evaporate
in a broad range of industries: steel, shipbuilding, consumer electronics,
automobiles, semiconductors, computer peripherals, and machine tools, to
name some of the more obvious. The Japanese have also been making
significant strides in computer hardware, including supercomputers. 68
Software development benefits from, in addition to a measure of "creativity,"
disciplined procedures, basic mathematical skills, systematic training, support
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tools, and effective group communication as projects get larger. There is no
reason why the Japanese cannot do well in software; the evidence provided
here and in cases studies, moreover, suggests they may be leading in tool
application and management control.
Arguments will continue whether software development as a process is
more like art than science or engineering, or more like research and
development than manufacturing in a hardware environment. There may be
strong "cultural" or historical tendencies of U.S. software engineers,
especially those who are largely self-educated, to view software as largely a
form of art. Japanese managers and programmers may not have acquired
similar tendencies; and the historical commitment established in other fields
of firms such as NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, and Fujitsu to promote their skills
in engineering, manufacturing, and quality control may in fact be overcoming
any predisposition of their software people against a factory approach. These
issues will be treated in studies of individual firms.
But the bias of managers regarding this question is not trivial. It may
be at least as important as the characteristics of the technology, to the
extent that managerial (and worker) attitudes constrain or facilitate the
ability of organizations to improve the performance of their people and
systems, as well as the features of their products. But even if one assumes
aspects of the software-development process, such as detailed design in a
large program, are essentially similar to a creative product development, a
firm can still apply strategic measures to technology development and
utilization, and to policies or procedures, to "rationalize" and improve overall
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performanc:e. Moreover, if some firms deemphasize discipline and cooperation
while focusinc essentially on the individual engineer, the individual tool, or
the final product, then they may not be fully developing -- that is,
compared to some of their competitors -- organizational capabilities to
maximize the performance of their technical people and invested resources.
The apparent superceding of Brooks' "law" in a Japanese software
factory encourages the belief that it is possible to manage software and
perhaps engineering activities more strategically, through a better integration
of technology and management policies. That some firms are closer than
others to implementing flexible-factory models also suggests there is nothing
inherent in the technology to prevent the introduction of this approach. If
managers claim a factory environment as proposed in this paper is
undesirable because of the tradeoffs it may entail, they make a strategic
judgement. If they insist it is technologically too difficult, they exhibit a
conceptual or even emotional bias that, in view of the present study, merits
serious reconsideration.
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APPENDICES
Formal Hypothesis Tests (1-3)
Hypothesis 1: Accept
Variable:
Sample Size:
Average:
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation:
Range
Kurtosis:
Standardized Kurtosis:
(Facilities' scores follow a normal distribution)
Totals
38
66.89
70
86
17.26
76
0.31
0.40
Technolo
38
71.18
77
84
17.40
70
0.03
0.03
Hypothesis 2: Accept (There is no significant difference in the
technology scores of the U.S. and Japanese
facilities. )
Two Sample Analysis Results: Technology Scores
Observations:
Average:
Std. Deviation:
Median
Japanese
17
75.47
15.10
78
U, S.
21
67.71
18.68
72
Pooled
38
71.18
17.18
77
Null Hypothesis (Ho): There is no significant difference in the technology
scores of the U.S. and Japanese facilities.
Confidence Interval for Difference
Hypothesis Test for Ho: Diff = 0
vs. Alt: Not Equal
at Alpha = 0.05 or 0.01
in Means: 95% or 99%
Computed t statistic = 1.38347
Sig. Level = 0.175039
Do Not Reject Null Hypothesis
Policy
38
64.45
67
43
18.59
82
0.02
0.03
56
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Hyvothesis 3: Accept (Japanese score for policy/methodology
infrastructure as well as Japanese total score
significantly higher than the comparable U.S.
scores)
Two Sample Analysis Results: Policy Scores
Observations:
Average:
Std. Deviation:
Median
Japanese
17
74.88
15.65
73
Null Hypothesis (Ho): Japanese score for policy/methodology infrastructure
as well as Japanese total score are not significantly
higher than the comparable U.S. scores.
Confidence Interval for Difference in Means: 95% or 99%
Hypothesis Test for Ho: Diff = 0 Computed t statistic = 3.5745
vs. Alt: Not Equal Sig. Level = 1.02177E-3
at Alpha = 0.05 or 0.01 Reject Hypothesis
Two SamPle Analysis Results: Total Scores
Observations:
Average:
Std. Deviation:
Median
Japanese
17
75.18
15.26
75
Confidence Interval for Difference
Hypothesis Test for Ho: Diff = 0
vs. Alt: Not Equal
at Alpha = 0.05 or 0.01
in Means: 95% or 99%
Computed t statistic = 2.96441
Sig. Level = 5.35201E-3
Reject Hypothesis
Sample Characteristics:
Variable:
Sample Size:
Average:
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation:
Range
Kurtosis:
Standardized Kurtosis:
Japanese
17
75.47
78
84
15.10
57
0.35
0,29
U.S.
21
56.0
16.61
59
Pgooled
38
64.45
16.19
67
U-Sw
21
60.0
16.03
62
38
66.79
15.70
70
U.S.
21
60
62
61
16.03
65
0.80
0.75
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MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR SURYEY OQUESTIONS
SURVEY ANSWERS KEY:
4 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS FULLY USED OR ENFORCED
3 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS FREQUENTLY USED OR ENFORCED
2 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS SOMETIMES USED OR ENFORCED
1 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS SELDOM USED OR ENFORCED
0 = CAPABILITY OR POLICY IS NOT USED
n = 38 (Jap. = 17, U.S. = 21)
I. TECHNOLOGY/FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE
ALL COMPANIES/FACILITIES
All Companies
Mean S Dev.
3.47 0.62
3.45 0.71
3.07 1.02
2.55 1.04
2.68 1.18
3.04 1.08
2.67 1.25
1.85 1.06
Japanese
Mean S. _Dev.
3.38 0.65
3.69 0.48
2.97 0.87
2.99 0.67
2.44 1.17
3.40 0.86
2.94 1.08
2.37 0.82
Mean S
3.55
3.25
3.15
2.20
2.88
2.75
2.45
1.43
APPLICATIONS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
3.35 0.62 3.15 0.71 3.50
3.31 0.76 3.58 0.52 3.12
2.97 1.10 2.70 0.93 3.16
2.54 0.93 2.83 0.67 2.33
2.65 1.25 2.20 1.27 2.96
2.84 1.18 3.23 0.98 2.56
2.54 1.36 2.75 1.66 2.39
1.86 1.04 2.38 0.64 1.50
SYSTEMS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
3.68 0.55 3.71 0.36
3.68 0.52 3.86 0.35
3.25 0.84 3.36 0.58
2.57 1.19 3.21 0.59
2.75 1.05 2.79 0.92
3.39 0,74 3.64 0.58
2.89 1.00 3.21 0.59
1.82 1.08 2.36 1.03
3.64
3.50
3.14
1 .93
2.71
3.14
2.57
1.29
. Dev
0.58
0.79
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.14
1.34
1.04
0.50
0.84
1.18
1.03
1.14
1.24
1.39
1.12
0.69
0.60
1 .03
1 .29
1. 16
0.79
1 .21
0.84
Question
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
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II. METHOQDOLOGY & POLICY INFRAST RUCTURE
ALL COMPANIESLEACILITIES
All Comanies
Mean S. Dev.
1.77
2.50
3.33
2.00
2.81
2.67
2.46
2.07
1.99
2.53
1.94
2.90
3.18
2.71
2.61
1.20
1.30
0.89
1.11
1.07
0.98
1.16
1.28
1.04
1.25
1.27
1.17
1.10
1.03
1.13
Japanese
Mean S Dev.
1.85
2.98
3.55
2.05
3.20
3.30
2.75
2.88
2.58
2.90
2.33
2.75
3.65
3.13
3.48
1.14
1.08
0.65
1.21
0.95
0.60
1.17
0.85
0.87
1.24
1.43
1.29
0.63
0.75
0.53
Mean S. De.
1.71 1.24
2.16 1.34
3.18 0.99
1.96 1.03
2.54 1.06
2.21 0.94
2.25 1.11
1.50 1.22
1,57 0.94
2.26 1.19
1.67 1.05
3.01 1.06
2.85 1.24
2.42 1.10
2.00 1.04
APPLICATI
1.77
2.50
3.33
2.00
2.81
2.67
2.46
2.07
1.99
2.53
1.94
2.90
3.18
2.71
2.61
ONS COMPANIES/FACI
1.20
1.30
0.89
1.11
1.07
0.98
1.16
1.28
1.04
1.25
1.27
1.17
1.10
1.03
1.13
1.85
2.98
3.55
2.05
3.20
3.30
2.75
2.88
2.58
2.90
2.33
2.75
3.65
3.13
3.48
1.14
1.08
0.65
1.21
0.95
0.60
1.17
0.85
0.87
1.24
1.43
1.29
0.63
0.75
0.53
SYSTEMS COMPANIES/FACILITIES
2.21 1.03 2.43 1.08
2.50 1.04 2.86 0.95
3.86 0.40 3.93 0.17
2.43 1.13 2.79 1.19
3.21 0.65 3.36 0.69
2.75 0.96 3.29 0.52
LITIES
1.71
2.16
3.18
1.96
2.54
2.21
2.25
1.50
1.57
2.26
1.67
3.01
2.85
2.42
2.00
2.00
2.14
3.79
2.07
3.07
2.21
Question
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
N
0
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
N
O
A
B
C
D
E
F
1.24
1.34
0.99
1.03
1.06
0.94
1.11
1.22
0.94
1.19
1.05
1.06
1.24
1.10
1.04
0.93
0.99
0.52
0.94
0.56
0.99
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G
H
J
K
L
M
N
O
2.54
2.21
2.21
2.54
2.18
3.36
3.61
2.54
2.39
1.13
1.47
1.24
1.20
1.42
0.61
0.43
1.19
1.18
2.71
3.57
2.64
3.36
3.14
3.36
3.71
3.07
2.86
0.84
0.42
1.19
1.03
1.16
0.79
0.36
0.94
1.38
2.36
0.86
1.79
1.71
1.21
3.36
3.50
2.00
1.93
1.33
0.69
1.13
0.70
0.92
0.35
0.46
1.16
0.68
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How do you measure the "performance" of your DrojeCt
manaaers?
Japanese ADplications:
1: Quality, cost, delivery; leadership, presentation, negotiation ability
2: Cost: Cost/person and profit/person
3: Productivity and management of personnel
4: Productivity: released loc/man month; Cost Productivity: cost/released
lines of code
US Applications:
1: Don't
2: Quality of product (error-free, minimal rework); delivered on time;
within budget; satisfaction of customer
3: Customer satisfaction in meeting schedules, staying within budget, and
meeting performance requirements
4: Cost/schedule
5: Meeting schedule and user requirements; cost is secondary
6: 1) When they indicate coding is completed; 2) number of bugs reported
in-house or beta-site after coding is completed
7: Budget dollars, schedule performance, technical scope, group turnover,
customer satisfaction
8: Budget and schedule plus quality
9: Cost and scedule performance indexes; rate charts; milestone
completions; lead division interface; customer satisfaction; personnel
management activities
10: Subjectively
11: Schedule aherence
12: Schedule, cost, number of modules forecast vs. actual (yet to be
implemented measurements should include errors or quality of code, and
ease of maintenance)
13: Adherence to schedule; molding of a cohesive group or not
Japan Systems:
1: Growth rate of members through the project; productivity of the
project; quality of the project; experience
2: 170 items related to project control (quality, delivery, cost).
3: Code trace and stress testing with tools or terminals
US Systems:
1: Meeting functional requirements; schedule
2: Revenue/cost
3: Cost/schedule performance
4: Achieving schedule completion and the amount of defects discovered in
the testing process
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Question,:
How do you measure the "performance" of your programmers?
Japanese APolications:
1: Productivity and product quality; source program update frequency of
programmers
2: Capability: loc, specification pages, and test items per person/month,
with adjustments for type of product, correctness, bugs, etc.; separate
categories for analysts, designers, programmers, and test engineers
3: Steps/time
4: Released loc/hour or loc/month
5: Acurracy and quality of the product
US ApDlications:
1: Schedule; LOC/Complexity; Errors
2: Amount of work completed; correctness of work done; ability to meet
schedule; innovation in solving technical problems
3: Comparisons to peers based on use of performance appraisal forms (20
attributes); feedback from project supervisors concerning performance;
letters of recognition
4: Cost, schedule, quality
5: Project leaders write "Performance Aanalysis" reports on each member
at the end of the project
6: As a function of quality, productivity, contribution
7: Perception. Measure against goals after the period of measurement is
completed.
8: Through A/O process; speed, accuracy, and quality of final program
product. Additionally, teamwork and schedule, and finally,
documentation.
9: Performance to schedule. Quality of code.
10: Productivity (sloc/mo), meeting schedules, growth
11: Subjectively
12: Judgement based on software ize, complexity, implementation
environment, quality, completion relative to projected cost and schedule,
hours worked, cooperativeness, internal and external communication
skills.
13: Schedules, errors in completed code, documentation, maintainability of
code, installability, design
14: Ability to design, function in a group atmosphere, code from specs,
adherence to schedules
Japanese Systems:
1: Productivity quality of programs written; experience
2: Discovered bugs/1000 loc
3: Lines of code/month
US Systems:
1: Closeness to functional and schedule targets, with acceptable
performance
2: No formulas, but a look a productivity, quality, and leadership
3: Schedule, product quality
4: Schedule achievement and technical review of design, code, test output;
measured number of defects
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includes delivery, and that "Manufacturing" on the hardware side includes
testing, adding "Service" to the hardware product life cycle would complete
an analogy to software. See B.W. Boehm, "Software Engineering," IEEE
Transactions on Computers, December 1976, Vol. C-25, No. 12, pp. 1126-1141;
and Edgar A. Pessemier, Product Management: Strategy and Organization,
New York, John Wiley Sons, 1982, p. 362.
66. See R. Goldberg, "Software Engineering: An Emerging Discipline," IBM
Systems Journal, Vol. 25, Nos. 3/4, 1986, pp. 334-353. A discussion of
this shift in focus to enviroments can also be found in Horst Hunke, ed.,
Software Engineering Environments (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1981).
67. For a discussion of strategic management concepts see Arnoldo C. Hax
and Nicolas S. Majluf, Strategic Management: An Integrative Perspective
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1984), especially pp. 72-107.
68. In terms of computing performance per cost, mainframes produced by
Hitachi, Fujitsu, and NEC for several years have all been ranked equivalent
or superior to IBM machines. See, for example, Dale F. Farmer, "IBM-
Compatible Giants," Datamation, December 1981, pp. 92-104; "2 New
Computers from I.B.M. Rival," The New York Times, 12 March, 1985, p. D5;
Nikkei Computer, 4 March 1985, pp. 49-50 (Japanese). For supercomputers,
where NEC may very well be taking the lead, see Raul Mendez and Steve
Orszag, "The Japanese Supercomputer Challenge," Datamation, 15 May 1984,
pp. 113-119.
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